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Deal Breakage in Domestic and
Cross-Border Mergers and
Acquisitions: New Data and
Avenues for Research
Morgan Ricks*
ABSTRACT
This Article presents a newly constructed mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) data set that can support detailed analysis of
deal outcomes, including deal breakage. The main novelty of the
data set is a detailed classification scheme for characterizing deal
outcomes, using information drawn from public announcements
and news reports. The data set also includes a number of
variables, hand gathered from press releases and merger
agreements, that are unavailable in existing data sets in reliable
form, or at all. The data set consists of all definitive, signed M&A
transactions involving US public company targets with a deal
value of at least $1 billion from 1996 to 2018. The data set
excludes negotiations, hostile bids, and unsolicited offers not
resulting in a definitive transaction, which cannot be compared
apples to apples with deals involving definitive agreements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Beattie of the law firm Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
LLP—one of the leading corporate lawyers of his generation—had this
to say two decades ago about legal practice in mergers and acquisitions
(M&A): “Generally the business people want to get the transaction
done, to happen, and they want it to happen with the partner they’ve
picked. But legally you can’t always do what they want. Which is why
business people don’t like lawyers.”1 As Beattie implied, clients rely on
their M&A counsel to deliver deal certainty: to get the deal closed on
the agreed economic terms.2 Deal certainty can mean somewhat
different things for acquiring companies and target companies. For
acquirors, it largely means providing deal “protection”: basically,
preventing the target company from accepting a higher (“topping”) bid
from a third-party interloper.3 For targets, it largely means preventing
the acquiror from walking away from the transaction prior to closing
due to “buyer’s remorse” or for other reasons. Both parties typically
rely on legal counsel to help them secure any necessary regulatory
approvals.4
Despite the importance of deal certainty to M&A legal practice,
deal breakage or termination—the failure of a signed M&A deal to
reach closing, for whatever reason—has not received systematic

1.
Interview by John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian with Richard I.
Beattie, Chairman, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (July 23, 1999), quoted
in Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of Deal Protection, 69 STAN.
L. REV. 1013, 1073 (2017).
2.
Id.
3.
See, e.g., Christina M. Sautter, Promises Made to Be Broken? Standstill
Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 929, 932–33 (2013)
(describing deal protection provisions in M&A).
4.
See Ilene Knabel Gotts & Franco Castelli, Watchell Lipton Discusses U.S.
M&A Antitrust Enforcement for 2019 and the Year Ahead, COLUM. LAW SCH. BLUE SKY
BLOG (Jan. 7, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu [https://perma.cc/JH89-QBJ6]
(archived Feb. 16, 2020) (highlighting the role of legal counsel in clearing regulatory
hurdles).
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treatment from legal scholars.5 This gap in the literature can be
attributed in part to limitations of available M&A data sets, which do
not include reliable and detailed information about deal breakage.6
This Article describes a newly constructed M&A data set that can
support detailed analysis of deal outcomes, including deal breakage.
The key innovation of the data set is a detailed classification system
for characterizing deal outcomes, using information drawn from press
releases and other public announcements, as well as news reports. The
data set consists of all definitive M&A deals involving US public
company targets with a deal value of at least $1 billion from 1996 to
2018. The data set excludes negotiations, letters of intent, hostile bids,
and unsolicited offers not resulting in a definitive transaction. 7
Analysis of M&A deal breakage should be of interest to business
law scholars and M&A practitioners. It should also be of interest to
investors in public securities markets. When companies are being
acquired, their stock prices tend to be driven primarily by the prospect
of deal success or failure, including the prospect of material
amendments to the consideration offered.8 Merger arbitrage—the
practice of investing in the securities of publicly traded companies that
are parties to pending M&A transactions—is a major “event-driven”
investment strategy among institutional investors, especially hedge
funds.9 Accurate historical data can assist merger arbitrage
professionals in evaluating deal risk.

5.
Prior studies that have examined some aspects of deal breakage include
Matthew D. Cain, Antonio J. Macias & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Broken Promises: The
Role of Reputation in Private Equity Contracting and Strategic Default, 40 J. CORP. L.
565, 566 (2015) (examining 227 private equity acquisitions between 2004 and 2010);
John C. Coates, Darius Palia & Ge Wu, Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to
Bidder and Target Shareholders? 1–2 (Working Paper, 2019) (studying the relationship
between M&A contractual provisions and deal outcomes for 819 US publicly traded
target firms for the period 2001–2011).
6.
See Cain et al., supra note 5; Coates et al., supra note 5.
7.
Some prior studies have lumped definitive deals with other situations,
arguably comparing apple and oranges. See, e.g., Jia Wang & Ben Branch, Takeover
Success Prediction and Performance of Risk Arbitrage, 15 J. BUS. & ECON. STUD. 10, 16
(2009) (describing various predictor variables used in the data set in addition to
definitive deals); Ronald W. Masulis & Serif Aziz Simsir, Deal Initiation in Mergers and
Acquisitions, 53 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 2389, 2390 (2018) (distinguishing
among deal types considered by the study).
8.
See infra note 35.
9.
See KATE WELLING & MARIO GABELLI, MERGER MASTERS: TALES OF
ARBITRAGE 1, 2 (2018) (defining “merger arbitrage” as “seeking profits by trading
securities involved in announced corporate events . . . in such a way as to limit the
trader’s risk, should the expected event fail to happen”); Sheng Wang et al., Systematic
M&A Arbitrage, DEUTSCHE BANK MKTS. RESEARCH (Sept. 28, 2015).
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II. DEAL UNIVERSE
The present study is concerned with definitive M&A transactions
involving US public company targets from the beginning of 1996
through the end of 2018, with a deal value of at least $1 billion. More
specifically, the data set consists of all M&A deals meeting the
following criteria:
• Definitive transactions only. The data set includes definitive
M&A deals only, meaning the parties must have signed a
definitive transaction agreement. Negotiations that did not
result in a signed merger agreement are not included. Neither
are rebuffed, unsolicited, or hostile offers in which the target
never agreed to a deal. Such situations are not “broken deals”
for purposes of this study since no agreement was reached in
the first place.
• 1996 to 2018. The data set includes deals signed on or after
January 1, 1996, and concluded (whether by completion or
termination) not later than December 31, 2018. The starting
date of January 1, 1996, was chosen because 1996 was the first
year in which all US public companies were required to use the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) EDGAR
database for their securities law filings.10 Consequently,
definitive merger agreements are publicly available and have
been downloaded for all deals in the deal universe, permitting
a rich set of variables to be gathered.11
• US target companies. The data set is limited to US target
companies. (The acquiring company, by contrast, may be a US
or foreign firm.) Limiting the data set to US targets ensures
public availability of definitive merger agreements and a
reasonable degree of uniformity of governing law.12
• Public company targets. The data set is limited to deals with
publicly traded target companies; it excludes all deals where
the target company is private. (The acquiror, by contrast, may
be public or private.) M&A transactions with public company
targets differ from those with private company targets along a
number of significant dimensions. Public company deals
typically trigger requirements under the federal proxy rules

10. Electronic Filing and the EDGAR System: A Regulatory Overview, SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/regoverview.htm (last updated Nov. 16,
2006) [https://perma.cc/Q7UB-26DP] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (detailing the history of
electronic filing via the EDGAR system).
11. Id.
12. Of course, corporate and contract law vary by state, and some regulatory
approvals (particularly for public utilities) happen at the state level, so there is some
variation in relevant law even for US-only deals.
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and/or tender offer rules,13 whereas private company deals
usually do not.14 In addition, private company deals commonly
include provisions relating to postclosing indemnification, as
well as “earn-out” provisions under which the consideration to
be paid depends to some extent on the postclosing performance
of the target company’s business.15 Such provisions are far less
common in public company deals. 16 Also, as explained below,
deals with public company targets make it possible to study the
premium paid as well as the “arbitrage spread”17 in the
transaction; these concepts do not apply where the target is a
private company. Finally, definitive merger agreements are
available through the SEC’s EDGAR database for all deals
involving public company targets, whereas most private
company merger agreements are not publicly available.
• $1 billion and up. “Deal value” refers to the value of the
transaction excluding assumed liabilities. The arbitrary $1
billion value cutoff was selected to make data gathering
manageable. The data set is currently being augmented to
include deals between $500 million and $1 billion in value.
To construct the deal universe, transactions with the foregoing
characteristics were downloaded from Thomson Reuters’ Securities
Data Company (SDC) Platinum database, which contains exhaustive
coverage of global M&A transactions from the 1970s to the present. 18
However, in constructing the deal universe, the raw SDC Platinum
download needed to be adjusted for the following reasons:19 (1) In some
cases, unsuccessful negotiations were coded as definitive deals.
Because this study is concerned only with deals in which there was a
signed, definitive M&A agreement, these were excluded. (2) In some
cases, acquisitions of partial stakes were coded as whole-company
deals. These were excluded. (3) In some cases, subsidiary dispositions
and other deals with private company targets were coded as public
company deals. Because the present study is concerned only with
transactions involving US public company targets, these deals were

13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(a) (2012)
(solicitation of proxies); see also § 14(d)–(e) (tender offers).
14. § 14(a), (d)–(e).
15. Brian J.M. Quinn, Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: The
Performance of Earnouts in Corporate Acquisitions, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 127, 144 (2012)
(presenting evidence that “earnouts are much more common in transactions where the
seller is a private firm.”).
16. Id.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See SDC Platinum Fact Sheet, THOMSON REUTERS (Dec. 2014),
https://my.refinitiv.com/content/dam/myrefinitiv/products/9086/en/BrochuresandF/sdcp
latinumfactsheet1214.pdf [https://perma.cc/B44U-MY38] (archived Feb. 5, 2020)
(describing the various features of the SDC Platinum database).
19. Items requiring adjustment were identified in the data-gathering process as
press releases and definitive transaction agreements for each deal were reviewed.

1028

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:1023

excluded. (4) In a few cases, so-called two-step M&A transactions—
transactions involving a first-stage tender offer followed by a secondstage squeeze-out merger—were coded as two separate deals. These
deals are two parts of a single M&A transaction and should therefore
only appear once. Duplicate entries were excluded. (5) In a handful of
cases, foreign target companies were coded as US companies. These
were excluded from the data set.
SDC Platinum also provides an “Attitude” field that records
whether the transaction was “Friendly,” “Hostile,” or “Unsolicited.” 20
However, hostile bids and unsolicited offers commonly lead to
definitive agreements between the parties, at which point they become
“friendly” deals. SDC Platinum has an “Attitude Change Flag,” which
appears to be intended to indicate when a hostile offer turns into a
friendly definitive transaction, but this variable turns out to be highly
unreliable. SDC Platinum also has a “Definitive Agreement Y/N”
variable that should, in principle, indicate whether a definitive
transaction agreement was signed between the parties. This field, too,
is unreliable; the present research identified more than three hundred
transactions in which this field was coded as “No” but in which a
definitive transaction agreement was filed in the SEC’s Edgar
database.21 In constructing the data set, all deals were individually
reviewed to confirm the existence of a definitive transaction
agreement, and deals not involving definitive transaction agreements
were excluded.
After the manual adjustments, the resulting deal universe
consists of 1,763 deals meeting the criteria specified above.
III. DEAL OUTCOMES
Most M&A deals are completed on the originally announced
economic terms, but other outcomes are also observed. In constructing
the data set, each deal was assigned an outcome—a “grade” of A, B, C,
D, or F—as follows:
• Alternate deal. Target company accepts a third-party topping
bid.
• Bump in consideration. Merger agreement is amended to
increase the per-share consideration paid to target
shareholders.

20. Some deals were coded by SDC Platinum as “Neutral” or “Not Applicable,”
the meaning of which is not clear. The attitude of each of these deals was verified by
examining company press releases. See id.
21. Cf. Coates et al., supra note 5, at 3 (“[W]e manually collect[ed] [M&A
agreement] clauses whereas prior studies use SDC data. We find that SDC often has
incorrect information about specific M&A contract clauses.”).
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•

Completed. Deal is consummated on the originally announced
economic terms.
• Decrease in consideration. Merger agreement is amended to
decrease the per-share consideration paid to target
shareholders.
• Failure. Deal is canceled for reasons other than a successful
topping bid.
These five outcomes are ordered roughly from best to worst from
the perspective of target company shareholders.22 In A and B deals,
target shareholders receive consideration in excess of what the original
merger agreement called for. In C deals, target shareholders receive
the consideration specified in the original merger agreement. In D
deals, target shareholders receive consideration below what the
original merger agreement called for. In F deals—the main focus of this
study—target shareholders receive no consideration because the deal
is canceled.
The data set further breaks down F deals into three categories:
acquiror withdrawal, target withdrawal, and regulatory block. In
acquiror withdrawals, the acquiror fails to consummate the
transaction despite the wishes of the target. Typically, the acquiror
claims that some condition to the consummation of the deal has not
been satisfied. The acquiror may claim that circumstances have
changed since the deal was signed—for example, a deterioration in the
target’s business, or an inability to raise external financing given
market conditions—entitling or forcing the acquiror to terminate the
deal. In a small number of cases, transactions were terminated because
the acquiring company’s shareholders voted the deal down.23
In a target withdrawal, the target company backs out of the deal
in a situation in which an alternate deal (third-party topping bid) is
not present.24 This is a very uncommon deal outcome.25 Most M&A
transactions contemplate that target shareholders will receive a
premium for their shares, and target companies generally do not want
to forgo the premium.26 In the data set, target withdrawals typically
involve situations in which the target has agreed that its shareholders
will receive consideration in the form of acquiror stock under a fixed
exchange ratio, and the acquiror’s stock price has nosedived since the
signing of the transaction, rendering the consideration unattractive.27

22. See infra Part III, Table 1.
23. See infra Part VIII (acquiror shareholders are entitled to vote on the deal only
in some circumstances).
24. See, e.g., Masulis & Simsir, supra note 7.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 2400 (finding average and median takeover premia of fifty-four
percent and forty-four percent, respectively, in a large sample of M&A transactions).
27. See, e.g., Humana Calls Off Merger, CNN MONEY (Aug. 10, 1998),
https://money.cnn.com/1998/08/10/deals/united/
[https://perma.cc/7DBL-9G2N]
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In these (rare) cases, it may be in target shareholders’ economic
interest to vote against the transaction.28 The parties may also
mutually agree to terminate the transaction in such circumstances.29
These mutual terminations are coded in the data set as target
withdrawals.
Regulatory blocks involve any situation in which a regulatory
agency blocks a deal.30 US and foreign antitrust authorities are the
most common sources of regulatory blocks in the data set. Regulatory
blocks can also come from sectoral regulators, such as federal bank
regulators, the Federal Communications Commission, state public
utility commissions, and the like. The Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is empowered to block
acquisitions of US companies by foreign companies where the
transaction implicates US national security.31 A handful of deals in the
data set were blocked by CFIUS; most involved acquiring companies
domiciled in China.32
SDC Platinum provides data fields that are pertinent to deal
outcomes, but these fields do not contain sufficient (or sufficiently
reliable) data to allow outcomes to be assigned at the level of
granularity just described. Specifically, SDC Platinum has an
“Outcome” field that classifies deals as “Completed” or “Withdrawn.”
However, this field classifies deals in which the target accepted thirdparty topping bids (category “A” above) as withdrawn deals. While SDC
Platinum also provides an “Outcome” field, which in some cases is
coded as “Sold to Other Bidder” or “Sold to Raider,” the field is not
reliably coded; in a number of deals involving successful third-party
topping bids, the “Outcome” field does not indicate this outcome. SDC
Platinum also has a “Value Amended” field that purports to indicate
when there was an increase or decrease in the consideration paid to
shareholders (categories “B” and “D” in the typology described above).
However, this field too is inconsistently coded: a large number of deals
not involving any amendment to the consideration are coded in SDC as

(archived Feb. 16, 2020) (“Humana Inc. is pulling the plug on its $5.5 billion merger with
United HealthCare Corp., citing a $2.9 billion drop in United HealthCare's stock value.”).
28. See id.
29. Id. (“The two companies said they had ‘mutually agreed’ to end the union and
that the decision was approved by both boards of directors.”).
30. See infra Part III, Table 1.
31. See The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/thecommittee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius (last visited Mar. 16, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/PP2C-APJM] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (explaining the role of CFIUS and
the transactions it is authorized to review).
32. The attempted 2007 acquisition of 3Com Corporation by Bain Capital and
Chinese technology company Huawei Technologies is an example. See Bain Says It Has
Terminated
3Com
Deal,
N.Y.
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(Mar.
20,
2008),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/bain-says-it-has-terminated-3com-deal/
[https://perma.cc/ZEA2-874S] (archived Feb. 5, 2020).
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involving such an amendment. Finally, while SDC Platinum offers a
“Synopsis” field describing each deal, it does not consistently provide
enough information to decipher deal outcomes at the level of
granularity described above.
Consequently, in constructing the data set, deals had to be
manually reviewed to assign outcomes. For every deal, company press
releases between the signing date and outcome date were reviewed for
each transaction to determine the deal outcome. In cases of deal
breakage, specific reasons for deal failure were recorded based on press
releases, news reports, and SEC filings (principally 8-K filings). As a
cross check, target company stock prices as of the outcome date were
compared with the originally agreed consideration per share to verify
the value received by target shareholders as of consummation.
Table 1. Deal Outcomes

A - Alternate Deal
B - Bump in Consideration
C - Completed as Announced
D - Decrease in Consideration
Acquiror Withdrawal
Regulatory Block
Target or Mutual Withdrawal
F - Failure

Count
Percent
33
1.9%
43
2.4%
1,580
89.6%
17
1.0%
38
2.2%
30
1.7%
22
1.2%
90
5.1%
1,763
100.0%

Table 1 presents the resulting deal outcomes for the 1,763
transactions in the data set. Approximately 90 percent of deals were
completed on the originally announced economic terms. Of the
remaining deals, a little over 4 percent achieved “premium” (A or B)
outcomes, meaning the target either agreed to a transaction with a
third party on superior economic terms or extracted additional
consideration from the original acquiror. Around 6 percent of deals
resulted in “adverse” outcomes, meaning either a contractual decrease
in consideration or deal breakage (failure).
IV. MARKET EXPECTATION OF DEAL BREAKAGE
How good is the market at judging deal breakage risk at the time
a deal is announced? As noted in Part I, merger arbitrage specialists
seek to profit from the spread between the per-share consideration and
the trading price per share of target companies in pending M&A
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transactions.33 To the extent capital markets are efficient, deal spreads
should equilibrate to a level that compensates the merger arbitrageur
for the risk she assumes in taking a long position in the target
company’s stock. The main risk is the possibility that the deal will
break, causing the target’s stock price to fall back to the “unaffected”
price it would fetch without the deal.34
The deal spread thus conveys information about the market’s
estimate of the likelihood that a deal will break. To illustrate, consider
a hypothetical deal in which one company (the target) agrees to be
acquired by another company (the acquiror) for $30 per share in cash.
Prior to announcing the deal, the target company’s common stock is
trading at an unaffected price of $20. The deal premium is therefore 50
percent (premium of $10 divided by unaffected price of $20). Assume
for simplicity that the target company does not pay dividends on its
common stock and that the risk-free rate is zero (no time value of
money). Assume also that market participants assign zero probability
to any third-party topping bid or amendment of consideration.
When the deal is publicly announced, the target’s stock price
immediately rises to (say) $28. What probability does the market
assign to deal breakage? The probability can be calculated as the deal
spread of $2 (that is, the $30 in per-share consideration minus the $28
market price) divided by the premium of $10 (that is, the $30 in pershare consideration minus the $20 unaffected price), or 20 percent. In
trader terminology, this is the “market-implied probability” of deal
breakage.35 In the simplified setting described here, market-implied
probability of breakage consists of the deal spread divided by the deal
premium.
In practice, merger arbitrageurs must adjust this calculation for
the relevant risk-free rate (assumed in the example above to be zero),
as well as expected target dividends per share between the signing date
and the projected closing date.36 Also, in deals involving stock
consideration, the merger arbitrageur must short the acquiring
company’s stock in order to “lock in” the spread,37 requiring additional
adjustments to the calculation of the market-implied probability of

33. See, e.g., Mark Mitchell & Todd Pulvino, Characteristics of Risk and Return
in Risk Arbitrage, 56 J. FINANCE 2135, 2135 (2001) (“After the announcement of a merger
or acquisition, the target company’s stock typically trades at a discount to the price
offered by the acquiring company. The difference between the target’s stock price and
the offer price is known as the arbitrage spread. Risk arbitrage, also called merger
arbitrage, refers to an investment strategy that attempts to profit from this spread. If
the merger is successful, the arbitrageur captures the arbitrage spread.”).
34. See Samuel G. Hanson, Merger Arbitrage at Tannenberg Capital, HARV. BUS.
SCH. 1–3 (Jan. 2, 2018).
35. See id. at 3 (“[A]n arbitrageur [can] back out a market-implied “break-even”
probability of deal failure by using the net deal spread and a downside estimate.”).
36. See id. at 2.
37. Shorting involves taking a position that will produce positive returns if the
security’s price falls.
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deal breakage in order to account for expected acquiror dividends
between signing and closing, as well as stock borrow fees that are
incurred in the process of shorting.38
Table 2 presents the market-implied probabilities of deal
breakage for all deals in the data set, broken down by deal outcome.
These probabilities were calculated on the basis of arbitrage spreads
as of the day following deal announcement, adjusted for the relevant
risk-free rate, projected quarterly dividends prior to closing, and
estimated stock borrow fees. The average market-implied probability
of breakage for all deals is 12.7 percent, measured as of deal
announcement.39 This is considerably higher than the observed 5.1
percent incidence of actual deal failure.40 A number of possible
explanations for this divergence can be hypothesized. One explanation
might be that merger arbitrageurs have systematically overestimated
deal risk in the time period under study. It seems doubtful, however,
that sophisticated investors would systematically overestimate deal
risk over a period spanning over two decades. Another possible
explanation might be that merger arbitrageurs expect deals to fail in
correlated fashion during “crisis” periods, making deal risk more
difficult to diversify (or more expensive to hedge) and thus causing
required risk premiums in merger arbitrage to be higher than they
would otherwise be. A third, related explanation might be that merger
arbitrageurs “correctly” anticipate the risk of crisis periods and
impound this risk into their trading decisions, but that such crises
happened to be underrepresented in the twenty-three-year period
under study. In other words, perhaps over a century or more, 12.7
percent of deals would ordinarily fail, but the twenty-three-year period
studied here just happened to contain only one major crisis event (i.e.,
the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009).

38. See Hanson, supra note 34, at 2.
39. Specifically, the market-implied probability of failure is calculated on the
basis of the deal spread observed at the close of trading on the trading day following the
deal announcement.
40. Rob Copeland, This Old School Hedge Fund Is Going Quant, WALL. ST. J.
(May 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/this-old-school-hedge-fund-is-going-quant1495635267 [https://perma.cc/NQ9H-HHEM] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (According to a
2017 news report, hedge fund Magnetar Capital studied historical deal failure over a
three-decade period and found that “while 7% of announced transactions eventually
collapse, the market behaves as if nearly twice as many do.”). While the deal universe
they were studying isn’t disclosed, my findings are roughly consistent with theirs.
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Table 2. Market-Implied Probability of Deal Breakage

A - Alternate Deal
B - Bump in Consideration
C - Completed as Announced
D - Decrease in Consideration
F - Failure
All Deals

Count
33
43
1,580
17
90
1,763

% of All
Deals
1.9%
2.4%
89.6%
1.0%
5.1%
100.0%

Market-implied
p(failure) on "Day 1"
10.5%
13.1%
12.0%
18.9%
24.3%
12.7%

Broken down by deal outcome, the market on “Day 1” assigns
higher probabilities of failure to deals that go on to fail (24.3 percent
on average) than to deals that go on to close on the announced terms
(12.0 percent). In other words, the market appears to successfully
identify ex ante which deals are more likely to break. Risk arbitrageurs
clearly do not have perfect foresight, however. For deals that went on
to break, the market on Day 1 assigned a 75.7 percent chance of
ultimate completion—in other words, arbitrageurs believed deal
completion was much more likely than not.
V. TIME TRENDS
Have patterns of deal breakage changed during the twenty-threeyear period under study? No obvious patterns emerge from the data.
Figure 1 shows “Adverse Outcome Incidence” by year of deal
announcement. “Adverse outcome” is defined as deals that break due
to either regulatory blockage or acquiror withdrawal, plus deals in
which there is a decrease in consideration—in other words, all deals
with outcomes of D or F, excluding F deals where the target withdrew.
In several years (2002, 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2018) there were no deals
with adverse outcomes. 2015 was an outlier, with 12.3 percent of deals
announced that year experiencing adverse outcomes, driven by an
unusual number of regulatory blocks. Deals announced in 2007 had the
next highest level of adverse outcomes, at 8.5 percent, driven by
acquiror withdrawals in the financial crisis.
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Figure 1. Time Trends
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Figure 1 also shows the average “Day 1” market-implied
probability of deal breakage by year. Notably, the market-implied
probability of failure exceeds realized adverse outcome incidence in
every year. In addition, a time trend is apparent: the first five years
have the five highest values on this metric. The actual incidence of
adverse outcomes for deals announced in those years was, however,
typical. In other words, the spread between market expectation and
realized outcomes seems to have narrowed somewhat after 2000. What
might explain these trends? One possibility is that market participants
learned over time to more accurately judge deal risk. 41 Another related
possibility is that merger arbitrage may have been an undercapitalized
investment strategy in those earlier years.42 Several years of high
returns may have attracted more capital to the strategy, lowering
spreads and bringing market-implied probabilities of failure somewhat
closer to reality.43
John Coates has observed that between 1996 and 2015, M&A
contracts more than doubled in size as well as in measures of linguistic
complexity.44 Impressionistically, contractual growth has not

41. Joseph A. McCahery & F. Alexander D. Roode, The Lost Decade for Hedge
Funds: Three Threats 23–24 Table 3 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper
in Law No. 486, 2019).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See John C. Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from
Twenty Years of Deals 1 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper in Law No.
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obviously affected the incidence of adverse deal outcomes as defined
herein. The extent to which specific contractual features are associated
with greater likelihood of deal completion is a key topic for further
study.
VI. TARGET COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS
The deal universe under study consists of transactions involving
US public company targets with a deal value of at least $1 billion. Even
within these constraints, the characteristics of target companies vary
in a number of respects that correlate with adverse outcomes. This
section looks at two dimensions of variation: target company industry
and size.
A. Target Industry
It would not be surprising to find that adverse deal outcomes
correlate with the target company’s industry in predictable ways. The
incidence of regulatory blocks, for example, might be expected to be
elevated in industries in which sectoral regulators are empowered to
block transactions, such as in portions of the financial services,
telecommunications, and public utility industries.45 In addition, one
might predict that the incidence of acquiror withdrawals and decreases
in consideration would be elevated in industries with high underlying
business volatility (such as the technology sector), and correspondingly
muted in industries with low underlying business volatility (such as
public utilities, which are legally shielded from competition and are
subject to rate regulation).46
To enable these and related hypotheses to be tested, all target
companies in the data set were assigned to one of nine industries:
Technology; Real Estate and Lodging; Energy, Metals, and Mining;
Healthcare; Financial Services; Consumer/Retail; Diversified
Industries; Media and Telecommunications; and Public Utilities. This
classification system corresponds to the common method of industry

333, 2016) (examining core findings that the quantity of M&A contracts and the language
of those contracts both grew in complexity over a twenty-year period).
45. The Federal Reserve, the Federal Communications Commission, and state
public utility commissions are empowered to block business combinations in large
portions of the banking, telecommunications, and public utility sectors, respectively. See,
e.g., 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1842(a) (Federal Reserve Board approval required for bank holding
company acquisitions); 47 U.S.C. Sec. 214(a) (F.C.C. approval required for certain
acquisition transactions).
46. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN
A NUTSHELL 8 (4th ed. 1999) (“In connection with public utility regulation . . . the ruling
agency will specify who can enter the business, what service they must provide, what
prices they may lawfully charge . . . and what investments they can include in their rate
base.”).
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classification that securities firms employ in their equity research and
investment banking operations.47 These assignments were based on
each company’s primary industry code under the North American
Industrial Classification System (NAICS), which are provided by SDC
Platinum.48 First, each NAICS code was manually classified into one
of the nine industries. Second, each company was assigned to one of
the nine industries based on the company’s primary NAICS code.
Figure 2 shows adverse outcomes by target company industry, and
it reveals some surprises. Neither financial services deals nor media
and telecommunications deals exhibit a high incidence of regulatory
blocks, despite the power of sectoral regulators to block many of these
transactions. Indeed, apart from public utilities, consumer/retail deals
have the highest rate of regulatory blocks, despite the fact that few
consumer/retail transactions are subject to sectoral regulatory
approval; almost all of these regulatory blocks were on antitrust
grounds. Deals with public utility targets do, however, conform to the
prediction of a high incidence of regulatory blocks. Public utility deals
are uniquely exposed to regulatory risk in the form of state public
utility commissions. In other sectors, regulatory blocks—whether
attributable to sectoral regulators or antitrust authorities—are driven
by federal regulators (or, in the case of antitrust, overseas regulatory
bodies in some cases).

47. About
Us
–
Investment
Banking,
J.P.
MORGAN,
https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/about/investment-banking (last visited Feb. 16, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/Z6G3-GHXX] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (For example, J.P. Morgan’s
website indicates the following industry coverage groups in its investment banking
division: Consumer & Retail; Diversified Industries; Energy; Financial Institutions &
Governments; Financial Sponsors; Healthcare; Real Estate & Lodging; and Technology,
Media & Telecom. This is very similar to the industry groups shown in the figure, the
only difference being that the figure (1) breaks out Technology from Media and Telecom,
(2) breaks out Public Utilities from Energy, and (3) omits Financial Sponsors (i.e., private
equity firms, which appear only as acquirors and never as targets in the deal universe)).
48. North American Industry Classification System, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/
(last
visited
Feb.
16,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/8E6Z-SZSH] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (NAICS is the standard used by
federal agencies in classifying US business establishments for statistical purposes).
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Figure 2. Target Company Industry
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Even more surprising is the incidence of acquiror withdrawals and
decreases in consideration by industry. Deals with technology company
targets, far from having a high incidence of these adverse outcomes,
have the lowest, with only 1.6 percent of technology company deals
failing on account of acquiror withdrawals, and zero of these deals
involving a contractual decrease in consideration. Likewise, deals with
public utility targets, far from having a low incidence of acquiror
withdrawals and decreases in consideration, have by far the highest,
at 8.1 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively. Further study is needed to
explain this outlier status. In any case, acquiror withdrawals and
decreases in consideration do not seem to be heavily driven by the
volatility of the target company’s industry.
B. Target Size (Deal Value)
How does the incidence of adverse deal outcomes correlate with
deal value (a reasonable proxy for the size of the target company)? It
would be reasonable to expect that, holding everything else constant,
larger deals would encounter greater regulatory resistance—in
particular from antitrust authorities—because market power is likely
to increase with company size.49 No such clear hypothesis suggests

49. Stephen Epstein et al., Mergers and Heightened Regulatory Risk, HARV. LAW
SCH.
FORUM
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(May
5,
2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/05/05/mergers-and-heightened-regulatory-risk/
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itself with respect to acquiror withdrawals and decreases in
consideration, however. One might, for example, predict that larger
target companies would retain higher quality deal counsel—
experienced (but expensive) M&A attorneys—leading to “tighter”
contracts and fewer acquiror withdrawals or renegotiations. At the
same time, acquirors would likewise be expected to retain higher
quality counsel in larger, higher-stakes deals, leading to transaction
agreements that present more optionality to acquirors to eject in the
event of a change of heart. In that case, acquiror counsel might
neutralize the effect of target counsel.
Deal value is available from SDC Platinum. Figure 3 shows
adverse deal outcomes by deal value, broken down by octile, with each
octile containing either 220 or 221 transactions. The octile ranges are
as follows: first octile, $1.0 billion to $1.3 billion; second octile, $1.3 to
$1.6 billion; third octile, $1.6 to $2.0 billion; fourth octile, $2.0 billion
to $2.6 billion; fifth octile, $2.6 billion to $3.6 billion; sixth octile, $3.6
billion to $5.6 billion; seventh octile, $5.6 billion to $10.3 billion; eighth
octile, $10.3 billion and up.
Figure 3. Deal Value
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The figure suggests that, overall, adverse deal outcomes tend to
increase with deal value. The seventh and eighth octiles have the
highest overall incidence of adverse outcomes, at 7.7 percent each. The
composition is different, however: the seventh octile is driven primarily
by a high level of acquiror withdrawals, whereas the eighth octile is
driven by regulatory blocks. Consistent with the hypotheses suggested

[https://perma.cc/7UJ2-B69E] (archived Feb. 21, 2020) (“[I]t is clear that it has become
increasingly difficult to obtain antitrust approval of large mergers.”).
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above, regulatory blocks are correlated with the largest deals: the
seventh and eighth octiles have the largest incidence of regulatory
blocks, at 2.3 percent and 5.4 percent, respectively. No clear pattern
emerges with respect to the other two categories of adverse outcomes
(acquiror withdrawals and decreases in consideration).
VII. ACQUIRING COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS
As described above, the deal universe under study consists of deals
with US public company targets. No restriction is placed on acquiror
characteristics, however. The data set therefore includes transactions
involving not just US but also foreign acquirors, and not just public but
also private acquirors. This section examines deal outcomes along
several acquiror characteristics: acquiror nationality, acquiror size (for
public company acquirors), and financial versus strategic acquirors.
A. Acquiror Nationality
US acquirors outnumber foreign acquirors in the deal universe by
a ratio of around four to one. How do US and foreign acquirors stack
up when it comes to deal outcomes? SDC Platinum supplies an
“Acquiror Nation” field for each transaction in the deal universe under
study here. Figure 4 shows that the incidence of adverse deal outcomes
has been higher for the US than for foreign acquirors. While the
incidence of regulatory blocks is roughly the same, the combined
incidence of acquiror withdrawals and downward adjustments are
more than twice as high for the US than for foreign acquirors, at 3.5
percent and 1.6 percent, respectively. Of course, transactions with US
acquirors and foreign acquirors may differ systematically in other ways
that are pertinent to deal outcomes, so caution is warranted in
interpreting these statistics.
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Figure 4. Acquiror Nationality
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B. Acquiror Size
Approximately 83 percent of the transactions in the deal universe
involved public company acquirors. In these transactions, the size of
the acquiror (as measured by equity market capitalization) can be
observed. Generally speaking, one would hypothesize that deals with
larger acquirors would face more regulatory risk, since larger acquirors
are more likely (all else equal) to possess more market power ex ante.50
As for whether large acquirors are more or less likely than smaller
acquirors to withdraw from pending transactions, no obvious
hypothesis suggests itself. Figure 5 shows adverse deal outcomes by
acquiror size, broken down by quartile. Equity market capitalizations
were downloaded from Bloomberg L.P. 51 As expected, regulatory blocks
increase with acquiror size. More interesting is the relationship
between acquiror size and the other types of adverse deal outcomes
(acquiror withdrawals and decreases in consideration). These
nonregulatory adverse outcomes have occurred far more frequently in
the bottom and second quartiles than in the third and top quartiles of
acquiror size. For acquirors in the top quartile—those with a market
cap north of $37 billion—acquiror withdrawals are extremely

50. Epstein et al., supra note 49 (“[I]t is clear that it has become increasingly
difficult to obtain antitrust approval of large mergers.”).
51. See Stocks, BLOOMBERG L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/markets/stocks
(last visited Feb. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9JTJ-7CRR] (archived Feb. 16, 2020)
(describing the financial analytics available through the Bloomberg L.P. service).
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uncommon, occurring in only 0.3 percent of cases, versus an incidence
of 3.0 percent in the bottom two quartiles combined.
Figure 5. Acquiror Size
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Why might larger acquirors walk away from deals less frequently?
One hypothesis is that they sign “better” deals by, for example, doing
more thorough due diligence and thereby avoiding postsigning buyer’s
remorse. A second hypothesis, in tension with the first, is that larger
acquirors are poor negotiators and fail to include provisions in their
agreements affording optionality to back out of a deal that turns out to
be bad. A third possibility is that larger acquirors give up this
optionality not because they are bad negotiators but because they
systematically trade optionality for other deal terms. Fourth, because
(holding everything else constant) any given acquisition is “lower
stakes” for a larger acquiror than for a smaller one, larger acquirors
might more readily decide to bite the bullet and complete a deal whose
fundamentals have gone south. Further research is needed on this
topic.
C. Strategic versus Financial
M&A acquirors can be classified as either “strategic acquirors” or
“financial acquirors.” Financial acquirors are private equity funds,
which are in the business of collecting money from large capital
suppliers (pension funds, university endowments, very wealthy
individuals, etc.) in order to acquire companies for a limited time
period, typically four to seven years, with the expectation of disposing
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of their investments through either privately negotiated sales or public
offerings of securities.52 Private equity firms aim to produce high
returns for their investors in part by improving the operations of the
companies they acquire.53 Acquisitions by private equity firms
typically involved large amounts of debt (leverage) and are therefore
often referred to as leveraged buyouts (LBOs).54 Strategic acquirors,
by contrast, are operating companies that intend to integrate the
target with their existing operations rather than to sell it later for a
profit.
Conventional wisdom among deal practitioners and market
participants is that financial acquirors are more likely than strategic
acquirors to fail to consummate transactions. 55 In part this is because
of private equity’s heavy reliance on debt financing. When debt
markets experience disruption, private equity firms may be unwilling
or unable to consummate pending M&A transactions. This happened
repeatedly in 2007 and 2008, when private equity funds backed out of
announced public company acquisitions of Huntsman Corporation,
Sallie Mae, United Rentals, and Penn National Gaming, among
others.56 On the other hand, one might hypothesize that regulatory
blocks would be observed less frequently in financial acquiror deals
than in strategic acquiror deals, since strategic acquirors by definition
seek to integrate the target company with existing (possibly competing)
operations, whereas financial acquirors may or may not have existing
portfolio company operations that are within or adjacent to the target’s
business line.57
SDC Platinum supplies a Y/N field for “Acquiror is a Leveraged
Buyout Firm,” but this field contains large numbers of errors; some
acquisitions by well-known private equity firms such as Apollo Global
Management, Blackstone Group, and KKR & Co. are misclassified as
non-LBOs. In addition, many “club deals” involving multiple private
equity acquirors are misclassified as non-LBOs, as are acquisitions by
existing private equity portfolio companies. In view of these errors, a
new “financial acquiror” field was constructed by reviewing
announcement press releases for each deal.

52. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth?
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 219, 222–24 (2009).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL.
L. REV. 481, 520 (2009) (“Strategic transactions lack the optional nature of private equity
acquisitions.”).
56. See id. at 498, 502, 514; Cain et al., supra note 5, at 566.
57. See
Strategic
vs.
Financial
Buyer,
CORP.
FIN.
INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/deals/strategic-buyer-vsfinancial-buyer/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/DEV7-ARQ4] (archived
Feb. 21, 2020).
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Figure 6 shows adverse deal outcome incidence by acquiror type
(strategic versus financial acquirors). The data are consistent with the
conventional wisdom and with the hypotheses described above:
financial acquirors have withdrawn from deals at nearly twice the
frequency of strategic acquirors. On the other hand, deals with
strategic acquirors have experienced regulatory blocks at twice the
frequency of deals with financial acquirors.
Figure 6. Strategic versus Financial Acquirors
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While these statistics should be interpreted with caution, they
provide suggestive evidence that target companies should seek to
extract a premium when negotiating a sale to a private equity firm,
given the possible higher likelihood of deal breakage. This topic merits
further study.
VIII. TRANSACTION CHARACTERISTICS
Which aspects of deal structure influence deal outcomes? This
Part uncovers some correlations that are visible in the data set;
questions of causation are left to future research.
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A. Acquiror Shareholder Vote
Whether or not the acquiring company’s shareholders are entitled
to vote on the deal might be expected to affect deal completion rates.
In M&A deals involving public company targets, shareholders of the
target company virtually always have the right to vote on the deal. 58 If
the acquiror is a public company, its shareholders may or may not be
entitled to vote on the deal.59 The interaction of deal structure with the
governing law of the acquiring company’s jurisdiction determines
whether the acquiring company’s shareholders have such an
entitlement.60 Generally speaking, if the acquiring company is a US
public company, its shareholders are entitled to vote on the transaction
only if the transaction involves an issuance of stock that increases the
acquiring company’s number of shares outstanding by more than 20
percent.61 If the acquiror is not a US company, the governing law in its
jurisdiction may require a shareholder vote in a broader range of
circumstances.62

58. “Voting” may consist of electing to tender shares into a tender offer.
59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 252 (2019).
60. See id.
61. See NASDAQ Stock Market Rule 5635(a)(1)(B), NASDAQ STOCK MKT.,
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp
%5F1%5F1%5F3%5F3%5F8%5F3&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequit
yrules%2F (last visited Apr. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5MUC-GW9Y] (archived Apr. 18,
2020) (shareholder approval); Shareholder Approval § 312.03(c)–(d), N.Y.S.C. LISTED CO.
MANUAL,
https://nyse.wolterskluwer.cloud/listed-companymanual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC-%7B0588BF4AD3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D--WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-94 (last visited Feb.
16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7P4B-JHVC] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (shareholder approval).
62. See, e.g., A GUIDE TO TAKEOVERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, SLAUGHTER &
MAY 5 (Mar. 2020), https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/39320/a-guide-totakeovers-in-the-united-kingdom.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ESN-QAPQ] (archived Apr. 5,
2020) (describing UK listing rules requiring approval by the offeror’s shareholders under
certain circumstances).
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Figure 7. Acquiror-Side Shareholder Vote
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It would be reasonable to hypothesize that deals conditioned on an
acquiror-side shareholder vote would, everything else equal,
experience a higher rate of adverse outcomes, given the additional
midstream veto point on the deal. In constructing the data set, merger
agreements for each deal were reviewed to determine whether the deal
was conditioned on an acquiror-side shareholder vote. About one-third
of the merger agreements contain such a condition. As shown in Figure
7, these deals had an adverse outcome incidence nearly twice that of
deals where no acquiror-side shareholder vote was required.
B. Type of Consideration
How does consideration type—all cash, all stock, or a mix of the
two—correlate with deal outcomes? On the one hand, using all-cash
consideration commonly allows deals to be closed more quickly, barring
significant antitrust or other regulatory hurdles. 63 On the other hand,
private equity (leveraged buyout) transactions are virtually always allcash deals and are widely perceived to present an elevated risk of
acquiror withdrawal.64
SDC Platinum includes information on consideration type. As
shown in Figure 8, all-cash deals have a lower overall incidence of

63. See GUIDE TO ACQUIRING A US PUBLIC COMPANY, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
11–12
(2015),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-acquiring-a-us-publiccompany-for-the-non-us-acquirer [https://perma.cc/X842-GWAN] (archived Apr. 5, 2020)
(describing speed advantage of two-step, all-cash transactions).
64. See Solomon, supra note 55 (documenting private equity deal breakage).
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adverse outcomes than other consideration types. All-cash and allstock deals have an equal incidence of acquiror withdrawals, but allstock deals were more than twice as likely as all-cash deals to be
blocked on regulatory grounds. This stands to reason: very large deals,
which are associated with elevated antitrust risk, are
disproportionately all stock. An interesting finding is that adverse
outcomes apart from regulatory block (i.e., acquiror withdrawals and
decreases in consideration) are elevated in mixed consideration (cash
and stock) deals. Indeed, these (nonregulatory) adverse outcomes are
more than twice as common in mixed-consideration deals as in allstock and all-cash deals.
Figure 8. Type of Consideration
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C. Premium
Most M&A transactions are announced at a premium: the agreed
per-share consideration as of the signing date exceeds in value the
unaffected, standalone trading price of the target company’s shares. 65

65. There are exceptions; for example, in a so-called merger of equals transaction,
target company shareholders typically receive little or no premium—indeed, the concept
of a “target” company often does not apply in these transactions. In constructing the data
set, announcement press releases were searched for the phrase “merger of equals” or
“combination of equals” to identify these transactions, which have special features worth
studying in their own right. Cf. Tommaso Ebhardt & Ania Nussbaum, Plunging Peugeot
Shows Who the Buyer Is in Merger of Equals, BLOOMBERG L.P. (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-31/investors-know-who-the-buyer-is-
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The relationship between premium offered and deal outcome is not a
priori obvious. On the one hand, high premiums may reflect high
motivation on the part of acquiring companies, suggesting that the
incidence of acquiror withdrawals might decrease with premium paid.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that acquirors are willing to pay
higher premiums in exchange for greater optionality to walk away from
the deal, in which case high premiums might be associated with a
higher frequency of adverse outcomes. Moreover, high-premium deals
might be more susceptible to buyer’s remorse from overpaying, with
correspondingly higher motivation to back out of a transaction ex post.
To gather deal premiums as of the announcement date,
announcement press releases were reviewed to determine the pershare consideration offered to target shareholders. Where the
consideration included acquiror stock on the basis of a fixed exchange
ratio, acquiror stock prices as of the day before the announcement were
downloaded from Bloomberg L.P. in order to calculate the value of
stock consideration. The total per-share consideration as of the day
preceding announcement was then compared against the target’s fiftytwo-week low stock price as of that date. This fifty-two-week low was
chosen as a common baseline. In many transactions, the target’s share
price just prior to announcement of the definitive transaction has
already been affected by the prospect of the transaction. For example,
the acquiror may have made public overtures or a hostile bid in
advance of the definitive agreement; the parties may have announced
negotiations; the existence of negotiations may have leaked to the
market; the target company may have announced “strategic
alternatives” or sale process; and so forth. In all but a small number of
cases, the fifty-two-week low excludes these preannouncement effects,
albeit at the cost of deviating from “true” unaffected price.
Figure 9 shows adverse deal outcomes by premium-to-fifty-twoweek low, broken down by quartile. The correlations provide initial
support for the hypothesis that high premiums reflect high acquiror
motivation. The incidence of acquiror withdrawals decreases
monotonically with this measure of deal premium. Whether deal
premium correlates with other variables that are pertinent to deal
outcomes requires further study.

in-fiat-peugeot-merger-of-equals [https://perma.cc/LT7Z-HANM] (archived Feb. 5, 2020)
(“Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV and PSA Group went out of their way to make their
combination as equal as possible, shedding assets, paying special dividends and
distributing board seats. It didn’t take long for investors to figure out who the buyer is.
Shares of Fiat Chrysler jumped 10% Thursday after the two sides announced the deal,
billed as a 50-50 merger. Peugeot owner PSA fell by about the same amount, taking the
typical acquirer’s hit.”).
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Figure 9. Premium to Target’s 52-Week Low
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IX. LEGAL ADVISORS
Mergers and acquisitions are a high-profile and lucrative area of
corporate legal practice. Clients rely on their M&A counsel to navigate
legal and regulatory hurdles and to negotiate favorable deal terms. In
theory, more competent and experienced M&A counsel will deliver
better deal terms for their clients. As noted in Part I, target companies
favor contracts that limit the acquiror’s ability to withdraw from the
deal, while also preserving maximum optionality for the target to
accept a third-party topping bid if one materializes. 66 Acquiring
companies prefer the opposite: contracts that preserve their ability to
withdraw from the deal, while also limiting the target company’s
ability to accept a third-party topping bid.
Figure 10 shows the twenty law firms with the leading market
shares in the deal universe, as measured by the aggregate value of
transactions on which the law firm served as advisor to either the
target or acquiror. Skadden leads the league table with over $4 trillion
in deals involving US public company targets of at least $1 billion in
the 1996 to 2018 time period. There is a sizeable gap of over $1 trillion
between the fourth and fifth firms. This discontinuity suggests a
distinction between what can be labeled the “bulge bracket” M&A law

66.

See supra Part I.
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firms—the top four in this league table, consisting of Skadden,
Simpson Thacher, Sullivan & Cromwell, and Wachtell—and the rest.
Figure 10. Law Firm League Table
$4.5

$4.0
$3.5

Trillions

$3.0
$2.5
$2.0
$1.5
$1.0
$0.5

Skadden
Simpson Thacher
Sullivan & Cromwell
Wachtell
Cravath
Davis Polk
Shearman & Sterling
Cleary Gottlieb
Dewey & LeBoeuf
Latham & Watkins
Weil Gotshal
Fried Frank
Jones Day
Debevoise
Paul, Weiss
Gibson Dunn
Morris Nichols
White & Case
Clifford Chance
Willkie Farr

$0.0

How do deal outcomes correlate with engagement of bulge bracket
M&A counsel? SDC Platinum indicates the law firm(s) that advised the
parties in each deal. Figure 11 shows adverse deal outcomes for deals
in which only the target company engaged a bulge bracket law firm
and those in which only the acquiring company engaged a bulge
bracket law firm. These two categories comprise 930 deals, or a little
more than half of the deal universe. This initial cut at the data provides
suggestive evidence that the most experienced M&A law firms deliver
value to their clients. Deals in which a bulge bracket firm represents
the target but not the acquiror experience a significantly lower
frequency of acquiror withdrawals than do those in which a bulge
bracket firm represents the acquiror but not the target. This finding is
consistent with the hypothesis that the most experienced M&A counsel
(measured at the law firm level) succeed in negotiating superior deals
for their clients, at least when matched against less experienced M&A
counsel.67

67. Cf. C.N.V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Experience and Merger
and Acquisition Outcomes, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 189 (2013) (finding that “top-market-
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Figure 11. Adverse Outcomes by Party Using “Bulge Bracket”
M&A Law Firm
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Figure 12 provides further preliminary support for the hypothesis
that law firms matter. Instead of showing adverse outcomes, it shows
premium outcomes: deals in which the target later received a more
favorable deal (from an economic perspective) than the one originally
signed. Here again, target companies have achieved better outcomes at
higher frequencies when they have retained bulge bracket counsel and
the acquiror has not. Acquirors have done better—specifically, they
have avoided the need to pony up additional consideration—when they
alone have used a bulge bracket firm.

share law firms are associated with a number of important bid outcomes and
characteristics.”).
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Figure 12. Premium Outcomes by Party Using “Bulge Bracket”
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As with the other statistics reported in this Article, these
correlations should be interpreted with caution. Use of bulge bracket
counsel by one party or the other may correlate with company or deal
characteristics in systematic ways that are relevant to deal outcomes.
While the “target only” and “acquiror only” deals are roughly the same
size on average—$5.4 billion and $5.6 billion, respectively—the deals
may vary along other important dimensions. The influence of legal
counsel on transactional outcomes has previously been studied in a
variety of settings;68 extending these studies to M&A deal outcomes
may be a fruitful area for future research.
X. POSTSIGNING MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
So called financing conditions—provisions in merger agreements
specifying that the acquiror’s obligation to complete the transaction is
conditioned on its ability to raise the requisite external financing—are
very unusual in public company M&A deals. Data from SDC Platinum
indicate that only twenty-one deals (1.2 percent of deals) in the deal

68. See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi & Elisabeth de Fontenay, Is There a First-Drafter
Advantage in M&A?, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1120–21 (2019); John C. Coates IV,
Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301,
1302 (2001); Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional
Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 395 (2015); Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete
Contracts 6 (Working Paper, 2019).
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universe contain such a condition. Of the twenty-one deals with a
financing condition, there were four acquiror withdrawals and no other
adverse outcomes. Given the scarcity of financing contingencies in the
deal universe, one might hypothesize that postsigning developments in
financial markets would have little bearing on deal outcomes.
Figure 13 analyzes the relationship between adverse deal
outcomes and changes in the BBB bond spread during the period
between deal signing and deal outcome, broken down by quartile. The
BBB bond spread, downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic
Database,69 measures the difference between the yields on a basket of
BBB-rated corporate bonds and the risk-free rate. It is commonly used
as a measure of financial disruption, as bond spreads tend to spike
during financial crises, when the availability of debt financing tends to
decrease sharply.70
Figure 13. Change in BBB Bond Spread from Signing to
Outcome Date
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The figure indicates that transactions in the top quartile (i.e.,
those coinciding with the largest increase in the BBB bond spread
between the signing date and the outcome date) experienced adverse
outcomes with substantially greater frequency than those in lower
69. FRED
Economic
Data,
FED.
RESERVE
BANK
ST.
LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/E58Q-KQ8P]
(archived Feb. 5, 2020).
70. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 262–64 (1983) (explaining
that the banking problems of the Great Depression “disrupted the credit allocation
process by creating large, unplanned changes in the channels of credit flow.”).
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quartiles. Combined acquiror withdrawals and decreases in
consideration were 5.7 percent in top quartile, more than double the
frequency observed in any other quartile. At least two possible
explanations suggest themselves. First, acquirors may sometimes find
that closing a transaction during a period of financial market
disruption is practically or legally infeasible. Committed sources of
debt financing may renege on their commitments; alternatively, the
acquiror or its financing sources may conclude that completing a
transaction under stressed conditions may constitute a fraudulent
conveyance under applicable debtor–creditor law. Second, it may be
that acquirors tend to exercise otherwise latent optionality in the
merger agreements (apart from explicit financing contingencies) at
higher frequencies during periods of financial market disruption.
Further research on this topic may shed light on the degree to which
“efforts” are contractible, even in high-stakes situations with
sophisticated and deep-pocketed contracting parties.
XI. CONCLUSION
Nine out of ten M&A transactions are completed on the originally
announced economic terms. The remainder end in some other outcome:
a successful topping bid, an amendment to the economic terms of the
transaction, or deal failure. M&A deal breakage provides an
opportunity for the empirical study of contracting outcomes in a highstakes setting with sophisticated and deep-pocketed parties, and in
which all agreements are publicly available. This Article provides an
initial look into a new data set that was constructed specifically for the
study of M&A deal breakage, a topic of interest to business law
scholars, transactional lawyers, other deal professionals, and merger
arbitrage investors.

